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TORT LAW-MuNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT ENFORCE­
MENT OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED STATUTES: MASSACHU­
SETTS LEADS THE WAY IN Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 
N.E.2d 1292 (1984). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The immense social costs imposed upon the public by intoxicated 
motorists I have prompted widespread demands for governmental ac­
tion. 2 In response to the campaigns of numerous citizens groups,3 
every state legislature has passed stricter laws4 increasing the penalties 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. 5 The Massachusetts legisla­
ture amended its driving under the influence statute6 in 1982 and Gov-
I. The casualties attributable to intoxicated motorists are staggering: 25,000 fatali· 
ties and 750,000 injuries annually; 70 deaths and 2,000 injuries daily. N.Y. Times, April 
15, 1982, at A-18. Analysts have estimated the annual economic losses involved at levels as 
high as $24 billion. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, INTERIM REPORT 
2 (1982)[hereinafter cited as COMM'N INTERIM REP.] 
2. COMM'N INTERIM REP., supra note I, at 3. 
3. Id. The largest of these groups is Mothers Against Drunk Driving(MADD). 
Candy Lightner founded MADD in 1980 after an intoxicated motorist killed her thirteen­
year old daughter. The group now has 320 chapters across the country and involves 
600,000 people. Friedrich, Man 0/ the Year: Seven Who Succeeded, TIME MAG., Jan. 7, 
1985, at 41. 
4. During 1980-82, thirty-four states enacted new legislation. COMM'N INTERIM 
REP., supra note I, at 3. By the end of 1984, all fifty states had passed new drunk driving 
laws. In July of 1984, President Reagan signed into law a bill reducing federal highway 
grants to any state failing to raise the drinking age to twenty-one. Friedrich, supra note 3, 
at 41. 
5. Statistics showing that drunk driving goes largely undetected undermine the deter­
rent value of the new legislation. Only one in 500 to one in 2000 drivers on the road with a 
blood alcohol content over .10% is arrested for driving while intoxicated. COMM'N IN­
TERIM REP., supra note I, at 2. The arrest rate averages approximately two arrests per 
year per uniformed officer. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL RE­
PORT 14 (1983). 
6. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 1984). 
On November 21, 1984, Governor Dukakis approved regulations adopted by the Alco­
holic Beverages Control Commission (ABCC) banning "happy hours," which are promo­
tions designed to boost the sales of alcoholic beverages through price reductions. See 
Prohibition of Certain Practices, 444 Mass. Admin. Reg. 59-61 (1984) (to be codifed at 
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ernor King approved it with an emergency preamble.7 As the duty of 
government to protect the public from the dangers imposed by intoxi­
cated motorists has emerged as a critical and unique area of govern­
mental responsibility, the courts are becoming increasingly involved in 
redefining the limits of municipal tort liability.s 
In Irwin v. Town of Ware,9 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a municipality owes a duty to the public with respect 
to intoxicated motorists and that tort liability may be based on the 
duty.!O The court concluded that under the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act!! a municipality may be held liable for the negligent fail­
ure of its police officers to remove an intoxicated motorist from the 
highway, when the motorist subsequently causes harm to other indi­
viduals using the highways.!2 By determining that the i'public duty" 
rule 13 did not bar the action,!4 the court distinguished prior prece­
dent!5 and rejected the majority rule.!6 
Although citizens groups acclaimed the Irwin decision as a vic­
tory,17 two other groups did not view it with favor: law enforcement 
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 204, §§ 4.00-06). The governor stated that such promotions "are 
a threat to public safety which undeniably contributes to drunken driving." Office of the 
Governor of Mass., News Release (Nov. 21, 1984). 
The ABCC promulgated the regulations after holding seven public hearings in cities 
across Massachusetts in August and September, 1984, at which "literally unanimous" testi­
mony supported banning "happy hours" statewide. Memorandum to Governor Dukakis 
from Paula Gold, Secretary of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulations, 2 (Sept. 28, 
1984). 
7. Act of Aug. 12, 1982, ch. 393, 1982 Mass. Acts 989-90. The legislature declared 
the law to be "an emergency law, necessary for the preservation of public safety." The 
amendment's purpose is "to provide an immediate increase in the penalties of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." Id. 
8. See e.g., Huhn v. Dixie Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(suit 
against city for injuries sustained by pedestrian struck by intoxicated motorist whom police 
had stopped but not arrested prior to accident, not barred by municipal or sovereign immu­
nity (rejecting Everton v. Willard, 426 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); City of Cape 
Coral v. Duvall, 436 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); and Evett v. City of Inverness, 
224 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)). See also infra text accompanying notes 106-08. 
9. 392 Mass. 745,467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). 
10. Id. at 755, 467 N.E.2d at 1300. 
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Supp. 1984)[hereinafter referred to as 
the Act]. 
12. 392 Mass. at 774, 467 N.E.2d at 1310-11. 
13. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
14. 392 Mass. at 755, 467 N.E.2d at 1299. 
15. Id. at 755-56, 467 N.E.2d at 1300. 
16. Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Oregon and Wisconsin have abolished the pub­
lic duty rule. 18 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04b, at 166-67 (3d ed. 
1984). See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
17. "I think it's absolutely fantastic ... police are paid by the public and have a 
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authorities claimed it would destroy the discretionary powers of po­
lice; 18 local citizens predicted that it would bankrupt municipalities. 19 
After surveying the history and the policies underlying the doc­
trine of municipal immunity in Massachusetts, this note concludes 
that the "public duty" rule should be discarded. The note suggests 
that the potential difficulties which the Irwin decision invites arise 
from the court's effort to create an exception to the "public duty" 
rule. 20 The note offers alternative approaches to the issue of liability 
that could be used to reach the Irwin result without decreasing the 
discretionary powers of the police or threatening municipal govern­
ments with bankruptcy. 
II. IRWIN V. TOWN OF WARE 
A. Facts 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 14, 1980, a Ware police of­
ficer observed an automobile departing from the Cue N' Cushion 
lounge at a high rate of speed.21 The officer stopped the vehicle for 
"driving too fast under the circumstances,"22 and radioed the police 
station23 for a second officer who arrived at the scene several minutes 
later.24 The driver admitted to the first officer that he had been drink­
ing,25 and the officer later testified that the driver's breath smelled of 
alcohol.26 
Upon the arrival of the second officer, the two conferred, leaving 
the driver in his car.27 An eyewitness later testified that while the of-
responsibility to the public. It's no different than a fire truck going by a burning house." 
114 N.I.L.I. 295 (1984)(telephone interview with Candy Lightner, president of MADD). 
18. "We don't disagree with police accountability, but what's happening is that po­
lice are only concerned about being sued and not using discretionary powers." 114 N.I.L.I. 
295 (1984) (telephone interview with Edward Merrick of the Massachusetts Police 
Association). 
19. See Margolick, Drunken Driving Case Divides Town, N.Y. Times, March 13, 
1983, § I, at 26, col. 2, 3 (discussing local reaction to jury verdict awarding Debbie Irwin 
$873,697 and noting that Ware's budget is $5.6 million, its unemployment rate is II %, and 
its average wage earner earns $15,000 a year). 
20. See Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801,438 N.E.2d 51 (1982). 
21. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 763, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. 
22. Id. 
23. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Irwin v. Town of Ware, No. 17562 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Feb. II, 1983). 
24. 392 Mass. at 763, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. 
25. The driver told the officer that he had consumed. "a couple of beers." Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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ficers conferred the driver moved unsteadily and held onto his car.28 
Despite his apparent intoxication, the officers merely gave him an oral 
warning29 and permitted him to drive his vehicle away.30 They admin­
istered to the motorist no field sobriety test.3l At about 2: 10 a.m., 
travelling at a high rate of speed,32 the motorist collided head-on with 
a vehicle operated by the plaintiff's decedent.33 The drivers of both 
vehicles died in the collision, as did Misty Jane Irwin, a passenger in 
the back seat of the Irwin vehicle.34 
The plaintiffs35 brought an action in Hampshire County Superior 
Court against the Town of Ware alleging a negligent failure of the 
police to take the intoxicated motorist into protective custody.36 In a 
special verdict, a jury found that the town's breach of its duty to exer­
cise reasonable care to protect the Irwins from harm proximately 
caused their injuries37 and awarded them $873,697 in damages.38 The 
town appealed from several evidentiary rulings and the denial of its 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict39 while the plaintiffs 
28. Id. 
29. "[The first officer] spoke with [the driver] for about one minute and returned to 
his cruiser." Id. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1305. The officer told the driver "Go home and 
drive carefully." Margolick, supra note 19, § I at 26, col. 4. 
30. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1305. 
31. Id. 
32. The driver's vehicle was traveling at a speed between sixty-five and seventy-five 
miles an hour at the time of the collision. Id. The driver's vehicle crossed the center of the 
highway and travelled about 400 feet on the shoulder, striking a utility pole before hitting 
the Irwin vehicle. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Irwin v. Town of Ware, No. 17562 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1983). 
33. 392 Mass. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1305. 
34. Id. 
35. The plaintiffs were Steven Irwin, by his mother and next friend, Debbie L. Irwin, 
and Debbie L. Irwin, in her own right and as administratrix of the estates of Mark D. Irwin 
and Misty Jane Irwin. Id. at 745 n.l, 467 N.E.2d at 1292 n.l. 
36. Id. at 746-47, 467 N.E.2d at 1295. 
37. Special verdict at 21, Irwin v. Town of Ware, No. 17562 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 
11, 1983). 
38. 392 Mass. at 747, 467 N.E.2d at 1295. 
39. Id. On the evidentiary level, the town primarily objected to the admission of a 
letter sent to the medical examiner of the town by the chief of the Clinical Chemistry 
Department of Laboratory Medicine at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center. 
Id. at 748, 467 N.E.2d at 1296. The letter reported the results of a blood alcohol analysis 
test performed on the motorist whose vehicle struck the plaintiffs. Id. 
On appeal, the court agreed with the town's argument that the business records excep­
tion to the hearsay rule did not support admission of the letter. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 233, § 78 (West Supp. 1984); Irwin, 392 Mass. at 749, 467 N.E.2d at 1296. See infra 
text accompanying note 42. The letter did not qualify under the statute because it repre­
sented the summation of an expert opinion, rather than a record made in the regular course 
of business, and because its author relied upon information from other persons who had not 
"reported that information as business routine." Id. 
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motioned for a new trial on the issue of damages for the death of Misty 
Jane Irwin.40 The supreme judicial court granted the plaintiff's mo­
tion for direct appellate review.41 
After review, the supreme judicial court remanded the case for a 
retrial on the ground that the trial judge had wrongfully admitted into 
evidence a letter reporting the results of a blood test on the intoxicated 
motorist.42 A majority of the court 43 concluded that Ware could be 
held liable under the Act for the negligent failure of its police officers 
to detain the intoxicated motorist if the failure proximately caused the 
plaintiff's injuries. 44 
B. Rationale 
Statutes define the powers and duties of Massachusetts law en­
forcement officers.4s In Irwin, the court viewed the statutes defining 
the responsibilities of police officers regarding intoxicated motorists46 
40. 	 Irwin, 392 Mass. at 749, 467 N.E.2d at 1296. 
41. 	 Id. 
42. Id. at 749-50, 467 N.E.2d at 1296-97. A settlement on February 7, 1985, 
avoided the necessity of a second trial. Under the terms of the settlement, Debbie Irwin 
and her son will be named the beneficiaries of a $1.9 million "dollar annuity contract that 
the town will purchase at a cost of $237,000. The Morning Union, Feb. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 
2. 
43. Justices Wilkins, Liacos, and Abrams joined Chief Justice Henessey, who wrote 
the opinion for the majority; Justices Nolan, Lynch, and O'Connor dissented. Irwin, 392 
Mass. at 775, 467 N.E.2d at 1311. 
44. 	 Id. at 774, 476 N.E.2d at 1310-11. 
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (West 1979). See generally MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 96 (West 1979)(setting forth administrative standards for department 
operations). 
46. 	 Those statutes and their text in relevant part are as follows. 
MASS. 	GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (West 1979): 
. . . public officers. . . shall suppress and prevent all disturbances and disorder. 
Id. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 21 (West Supp. 1984): 
Any officer authorized to make arrests may arrest without warrant and keep 
in custody for not more than twenty-four hours. . . any person operating a mo­
tor vehicle on any way . . . and any officer authorized to make arrests. . .may 
arrest without warrant any person. . . upon any way or place to which the pub­
lic has the right of access, or upon any way or in any place to which members of 
the public have access as invitees. . . who the officer has probable cause to be­
lieve has operated or is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. . . . 
Id. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(I) (West Supp. 1984): 
Whoever, upon any way or in any place to which the public has a right of 
access, or upon any way or in any place to which members of the public have 
access as invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. . . shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred 
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as evidence of a legislative intent to protect both intoxicated motor­
ists47 and other users of the highways.48 Noting that Masssachusetts 
had previously discerned a "special relationship" based on statutory 
responsibilities and legislative intent in cases holding liquor store own­
ers liable to the p'ublic for harm caused by intoxicated motorists,49 the 
court reasoned that the liquor store cases were at least analogous to 
the Irwin situation.50 The court therefore concluded that it could ap­
ply the analysis of the liquor store cases by analogy to the Irwin case. 51 
Using the analysis, the majority found that a "special relationship" 
based upon statutory responsibilities and legislative intent exists be­
tween a police officer who negligently fails to remove an intoxicated 
motorist form the highways and a member of the public who suffers 
nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than two 
years, or both. 
Id. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.90, § 24(1)(1) (West Supp. 1984): 
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any way or in any place to which the 
public have access as invitees or licencees, shall be deemed to have consented to 
submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath or blood in the event that he is 
arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.... 
Id. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 C, § 2 (West Supp. 1984): 
Any police officer assigned to traffic enforcement shall . . . record the oc­
curence of automobile law violations upon a citation. 
Id. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I11B, § 8 (West 1979): 
Any person who is incapacitated may be assisted by a police officer with or 
without his consent to his residence, to a facility, or to a police station ... 
No person assisted to a police station pursuant to this section shall be held in 
protective custody against his will; provided, however, that. . . an incapacitated 
person may be held in protective custody until he is no longer incapacitated or for 
a period of not longer than twelve hours, whichever is shorter. 
Id. 
47. 392 Mass. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. 
48. Id. Prior case law concerning issues of tort liability arising out of alcohol con­
sumption and motor vehicle operation had construed the applicable statutes as enacted for 
the dual purpose of protecting both the individual motorist and the general public as well. 
Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 10, 453 N.E.2d 430, 433 
(1983)(quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,201-02, 156 A.2d 1,8 (1959»; Adamian 
v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500, 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968). 
49. See 392 Mass. at 757-58, 467 N.E.2d at 1301 (discussing Michnik-Zilberman v. 
Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6,453 N.E.2d 430 (1983), and Adamian v. Three Sons, 
Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968». 
50. Id. at 757, 467 N.E.2d at 1301. 
51. Id. at 758, 467 N.E.2d at 1302. The dissenters sharply criticized the majority's 
analogy. Id. at 776,467 N.E.2d at 1312 (Nolan, J., dissenting). See infra text accompany­
ing note 59. 
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harm as a result. 52 The court stated that the "special relationship" 
would permit private negligence actions and render the public duty 
rule inapplicable. 53 The court thus defeated the town's argument that 
the public duty rule barred the action because its police officers owed 
the duty to the general public only, not to the individuals injured in 
this case. 54 
C. Dissent 
The dissenters55 objected that the majority's finding amounted to 
the creation of a new "common law duty" owed by the municipality 
through its police to each individual. 56 They stressed that a majority 
of jurisdictions require both privity between the injured party and the 
police, and specific assurances of protection made by the police in or­
der for an individual to maintain an action in tort. 57 Since neither 
factor existed in Irwin, the dissenters asserted that the plaintiffs had 
not demonstrated the requisite "special relationship" to defeat the 
public duty rule in tort actions against the police. 58 The dissenters 
also criticized the majority's reliance on cases concerning the liability 
of liquor store owners, on the grounds that the cases could not serve as 
analogues because the public duty rule is irrelevant when the defend­
ant is in the private sector. 59 Finding that the majority's ruling had in 
effect discarded the public duty rule and with it the "special relation­
ship" exception, the dissenters suggested that it would be wiser to ab­
rogate the public duty rule.60 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
Prior to 1978, the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity 
52. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04. 
53. Id. at 759, 467 N.E.2d at 1302. 
54. Id. at 754-55, 467 N.E.2d at 1299. 
55. Interestingly, Justice Nolan, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Irwin, wrote the 
Dinsky opinion for a unanimous court. See infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text. 
Clearly, the court is determined to retain municipal immunity for some torts. 
56. 392 Mass. at 776, 467 N.E.2d at 1312 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 775, 467 N.E.2d at 1311 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. at 776, 467 N.E.2d at 1311 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 776, 476 N.E.2d at 1312 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 777, 467 N.E.2d at 1312 (Nolan, J., dissenting) (citing Ryan v. Arizona, 
134 Ariz. 308,656 P.2d 597 (1982)). The Ryan court denounced the "speculative exercise 
of determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells 
no recovery, or ifhe had a specific individual duty," and abolished the public duty rule. Id. 
at 310-11, 656 P.2d at 599-600. 
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generally shielded Massachusetts municipalities from tort liability for 
the acts or omission of their employees.61 The doctrine developed 
from the ancient maxim "rex non potest peccare," meaning "the King 
can do no wrong. "62 England first recognized the doctrine in the case 
of Russell v. The Men of Devon.63 In 1812 Massachusetts followed 
Russell to become the first American state to adopt the doctrine in 
Mower v. Inhabitants ofLeicester.64 The doctrine remained popular in 
Massachusetts because it furthered two public policies. First, immu­
61. The terms "sovereign immunity" and "municipal immunity" refer to the com­
mon law rule precluding recovery in tort from a governmental entity. The distinction be­
tween the two forms of immunity lies in whether an individual seeks recovery from the 
government at the state or the local level. See Whitney v. City of Worcestor, 373 Mass. 
208,212,366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (1977). While municipalities traditionally held a govern­
mental immunity in tort, their immunity differed both in scope and in origin from the 
immunity of the sovereign. W..KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 131, at 1051 
(5th ed. 1984). In discussing the two forms of immunity in the case of Morash & Sons, 
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973), the supreme judicial court 
said: 
While it is true that there is a distinct difference in the legal basis, the difference is 
of no significance in our reasoning here. The separate reasons why the rule of 
immunity was established for the municipality, on the one hand, and for the sov­
ereign, on the other hand, may have been sound in their inception but they have 
long since lost their validity. 
Id. at 616, 296 N.E.2d at 464. 
For the sake of simplicity, this note uses the term "sovereign immunity." 
For a detailed history of sovereign immunity in England and its development in early 
American law, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REV. I (1963). Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1-45, 129­
143, 229-258 (1924) presents an excellent and exhaustive discussion of sovereign immunity. 
For a brief history of the doctrine in Massachusetts, see Note, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
609, 610-14 (1981). 
62. Comment, Municipal Tort Liability For Erroneous Issuance ofBuilding Permits: 
A National Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 538 (1982). 
Professor Borchard maintains that a serious misconseption of the origin of the maxim 
perverted its historical meaning. The professor claims that originally the maxim meant 
that the king was not privileged to do wrong and that its modern counterpart means that he 
is incapable of doing wrong. See Borchard, supra, note 61, at 17-35. 
63. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). In Russell, the court granted immunity to 
an unincorporated political subdivision of a county because of the lack of a fund from 
which to pay the judgment coupled with the inequity of imposing liability upon the citi­
zenry of the county. [d. at 672-73, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. Because the concept of a munici­
pal corporation was new at the time, suit had been brought against the entire population of 
the county. Id. at 667, 100 Eng. Rep. at 359. The House of Lords reasoned that because 
"the inhabitants of a county are a fluctuating body," it would be unjust to impose liability 
upon innocent parties named as defendants. Id. at 668, 100 Eng. Rep. at 360. The court 
failed to explain its requirement that there be a specific fund from which to collect the 
judgment. Id. at 672-73, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 61, 
§ 131, at 1051 (discussing Russel/). 
64. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). In Mower, plaintiffs brought an action for the loss of a horse 
due to negligent bridge maintenance. Id. at 250. On appeal, the court reversed a verdict 
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nity reflected the theory that municipal functions benefited the public 
rather than individuals or the municipality itself;65 second, immunity 
insulated governmental administrative decision-making from post­
facto judicial analysis which might impede governmental operations.66 
To alleviate the sometimes harsh results reached under the doc­
trine,67 the courts created numerous exceptions.68 As the doctrine be­
came "riddled with exceptions,"69 courts increasingly questioned 
whether its underlying premise remained compatible with the basic 
tort principle that liability follows wrongdoing.70 
Recognizing that blind loyalty to stare decisis would predicate 
modern law upon an "[e)ighteenth century anachronism," the 
Supreme Court of Florida abolished sovereign immunity in 1957.71 
Other jurisdictions soon followed Florida.72 As early as 1973, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressed its dissatisfaction 
for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the municipality neglected a duty to the general public 
only. Id. at 249. 
The supreme judicial court followed Russell although "the only similiarity between the 
situation[s] ... lay in the fact that the defendants were counties." Borchard, supra note 
61, at 42. 
65. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 216, 366 N.E.2d 12\0, 1215 
(1977). 
66. Id. at 217, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. 
67. Perhaps the most notorious case is Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 
456 P.2d 376 (1969)(en banc)(duty of sheriff to arrest intoxicated drag-racing motorists 
owed to general public and not to individual plaintiffs). The court subsequently overruled 
Massengill in Ryan v. Arizona, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982)(en banc)(state liable for 
injuries inflicted by escapee from juvenile corrections facility). 
68. Most prevalent was the governmental/proprietary distinction: insofar as munici­
palities exercise a governmental function, they are immune from tort liability, but when 
acting in a proprietary capacity, they are held accountable for their acts under ordinary tort 
law standards. E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 16, § 53.02, at 133. See, e.g., Bolster v. City of 
Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (19 I 7)(public baths constitue a governmental func­
tion when provided gratuitously by municipality). 
69. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 89,92 (1961)(discussion of the origin and history of sovereign immunity). 
70..E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 16, § 53.02, at 133. "That an individual injured by 
the negligence of the employees of a municipality should bear his loss himself instead of 
having it borne by the public treasury to which he and all other citizens contribute, offends 
the basic principles of equality of burdens and of elementary justice." Id., § 53.02, at 142 
n.11 (quoting Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.1. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970)(citing other jurisdic­
tions which questioned the doctrine on similiar grounds». 
71. E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 16, § 53.02, at 135 (quoting Hargrove v. Town of 
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133, 134 (Fla. 1957)(en banc)(plaintiff could maintain an 
action against city for wrongful death of husband caused by alleged negligence of a police 
officer acting in the course of his employment». 
72. See, e.g., Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, liS N.W.2d 618 (1962)(abrogat­
ing municipal immunity from tort liability); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 
211, 359 P.2d 457, II Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961)(rejecting doctrine of governmental immunity 
from tort liability as mistaken and unjust); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 
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with the doctrine, but found that comprehensive legislative action was 
preferrable to judicial abrogation of the doctrine.73 In the four years 
following its deferral to the legislature, the court declined two oppor­
tunities to abolish the doctrine, reiterating on each occasion its prefer­
ence for legislative reform. 74 
B. The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act 
In 1978, foHowing pressure from the court,75 the state legislature 
passed the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act,76 which provided that 
"[p]ublic employers shall be liable for ... the negligent or wrongful 
act or omission of any public employee. . . in the same manner and 
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."77 
The Act did not specify the situations in which municipalities could be 
held liable.78 It simply removed the defense of sovereign immunity,19 
leaving to the court the difficult task of applying the statutory lan­
guage to a wide variety of public functions. 80 
Ill. 2d 25, 163 N.E.2d 96 (1959)(discarding traditional rule of school district tort 
immunity). 
73. Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 614, 296 N.E.2d 461, 
463 (1973)(CommonweaIth does not enjoy immunity from liability ifit creates or maintains 
a private nuisance which causes injury to real property of another). 
74. See Note, supra note 61, at 609, 611 n. 24 (1981). In Hannigan v. New Gamma­
Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, 367 Mass. 658, 327 N.E.2d 882 (1975), plaintiff 
alleged that injuries sustained in a fall on a state college campus were due to the Common­
wealth's negligence. The court stated that it would decline to abolish immunity until the 
legislature either acted or demonstrated an intent not to act. Id. at 662, 327 N.E.2d at 885. 
In Caine v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815, 335 N.E.2d 340 (1975), the plaintiff in a 
wrongful death action alleged that the Commonwealth negligently caused her intestate's 
death by failing to remove an excessive accumulation of ice from a highway. The court 
again declined to abolish the immunity, on the grounds that the legislature had not yet 
demonstrated an intent by inaction. Id. at 816,335 N.E.2d at 341. 
75. See Whitney, 373 Mass 208,210,366 N.E.2d 1210, 1212 (1977)(declaring inten­
tion to abrogate sovereign immunity in the first appropriate case presented after the conclu­
sion of the 1978 session of the legislature, if at that time the legislature had not acted 
definitively; the court handed down its decision in August, 1977, and the Act was passed in 
July, 1978). 
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Supp. 1981). The House and the Senate 
endorsed bill 1647 was endorsed by the House and Senate on July II, 1978, and the gover­
nor signed it on July 20, 1978. Note, Sovereign Immunity in Massachusetts, 13 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 877 (1978). 
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Supp. 1981). 
78. The Act did, however, specify several exceptions to the waiver of immunity: 
claims in which the public employee exercised due care in the performance of a statutory 
duty; claims arising from the exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function or duty 
by a public employee; claims arising out of intentional torts; and claims arising in respect of 
the assessment of taxes. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 10 (West Supp. 1981). 
79. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text. 
80. Glannon, The Scope of Public Liabilty Under the Tort Claims Act: Beyond the 
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The lack of legislative history accompanying the Act further com­
plicated the court's task.8! The only statement of legislative intent ex­
ists in the legislature's declaration that "[t]he provisions of this Act 
shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes 
thereof. "82 According to subsequent court opinions, the legislature in­
tended a two-fold purpose: first, "to provide an effective remedy for 
persons injured as a result of the negligence of governmental enti­
ties;"83 and second, "to preserve the stability and effectiveness of gov­
ernment by providing a mechanism which will result in payment of 
only those claims against governmental entities which are valid, in 
amounts which are reasonable and not inflated."84 The statement of a 
dual purpose reflects the court's position that issues of municipal lia­
bility must be resolved such that "[a]n appropriate balance [is] struck 
between the public interest in fairness to injured persons and in pro­
moting effective government."8S To effectuate the intended result, the 
court has maintained that ". . . the Act simply removed the defense 
of immunity in certain tort actions ... [and] did not create any new 
theory of liability for a municipality."86 Actions brought under the 
Act are thus governed by the same theories of liability that apply to 
tort actions involving private parties. 87 
Public Duty Rule, 67 MASS. L. REV. 159 (1982)(discussing the public duty rule as a means 
of reinstating municipal immunity and concluding that Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 
801,438 N.E.2d 51 (1982) does not portend broad reestablishment of immunity). 
81. Note, supra note 61, at 613. The sponsors of the original bill declared that they 
intended "to abolish governmental immunity." Journal of the House of Rep., H.R. 1394, 
2330 (1978). 
82. Act of July 20, 1978, ch. 512, § 18, 1978 Mass. Acts 848. 
83. Vasys v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n., 387 Mass. 51, 55,438 N.E.2d 836, 839 
(1982). 
84. Id. at 57, 438 N.E.2d at 840. 
85. Whitney v. City of Worcestor, 373 Mass. 208, 216, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 
(1977). 
86. Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 805, 438 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1982). 
Other jurisdictions follow the Dinsky rule. See Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill. App. 3d 443, 410 
N.E.2d 610 (1980)(city not liable to rape victim for officer's failure to question or arrest 
assailant absent officer's knowledge of dangerous circumstances or control over the rape 
site); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)(although complaint 
against municipality for negligence inspection stated a cause of action, municipal immunity 
may be retained for public policy reasons); Duran v. Tuscon, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 
1059 (1973)(city not liable for injuries arising from its alleged negligent violation of fire 
code by permitting open ftame heater in body shop); Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne 
Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972)(city not liable for injuries sustained in 
motel fire although city issued building permit to motel not in complaince with building 
code; building codes are not insurance policies by which municipality guarantees 
compliance). 
87. Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 804-05,438 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1982); Beur­
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C. Dinsky and the Public Duty Rule 
Two years before the Irwin decision, the court adopted the public 
duty rule in Dinsky v. Framingham,88 thereby signaling an apparent 
willingness to limit municipal tort liability drastically. The plaintiffs 
in Dinsky purchased a residence that suffered water damage as a result 
of improper grading by the builder.89 The builder subsequently sold 
the residence to the Dinskys without first conducting a grading inspec­
tion as required by the Board of Health.90 Plaintiffs sought damages 
from the municipality for having negligently issued an occupancy per­
mit to the builder. The superior court directed a verdict for the town; 
the supreme judicial court took the case on direct appellate review and 
affirmed.91 
The public duty rule provides that to maintain a tort action 
against a municipality, plaintiffs must show that it breached a duty 
owed to them as individuals, and not a duty owed to the general pub­
lic.92 Where the harm suffered by plaintiff resulted from an activity 
klian v. Allen, 385 Mass. 1009,432 N.E.2d 707 (1982). See E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 16, 
§ 53.02, at 138 n.4. 
88. 386 Mass. 801,438 N.E.2d 51 (1982). 
89. Id at 801-02, 438 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 801, 438 N.E.2d at 51. 
92. E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 16, § 53.04b, at 165. See also Glannon, supra note 
80, at 159; Note, Municipal Tort Liability and the Public Duty Rule: A Matter ofStatutory 
Analysis, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 391 (1980)(discussing the public duty rule as applied to 
negligent inspections); Comment, supra note 62, at 548-552 (discussing the public duty rule 
as applied to negligent inspections). 
Numerous cases cite the public duty rule. See, e.g., Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 
279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (city ordinance requiring inspection for fire code violations 
and correction of them was intended to protect municipality as a whole, thus creating only 
a "public" duty to inspect rather than a "special" duty to individual members of the pub­
lic); Hannon v. Counihan, 54 III. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917 (1977) (plaintiff's complaint 
for damages against the municipality for inspector's failure to inspect adequately building 
foundation dismissed for failure to state a cause of action); Riss v. City of New York, 22 
N.Y.2d 579,240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (city not liable for failure to provide 
police protection to individual who was threatened with, and suffered, severe injury, on 
grounds that imposing a duty on police to protect the general public was unsound as a 
matter of public policy); Moudlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967) (city 
not liable for inspector's negligence in failing to inspect or negligently inspecting store mez­
zanine which fell and killed patron); but see Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 
(1982) (en banc) (state liable for injuries inflicted by escapee from juvenile correction facil­
ity); Stewart v. Schieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980) (building inspector's failure to examine 
plans prior to issuance of building permit as required by law rendered municipality liable 
for injuries caused when building collapsed); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 
1976)(state was liable for injuries sustained by hotel guests in fire because state assumed 
duty to correct fire hazards discovered by undertaking fire inspection and thereafter 
breached its duty by failing to take action with respect to several fire hazards); Coffey v. 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)(although complaint against 
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designed or executed solely for the benefit of the general public, the 
action fails.93 The majority ofjurisdictions currently follow the Dinsky 
rule. 94 
The municipality in Dinsky argued that the duty of its building 
commissioner consisted of ensuring compliance with the building code 
for the benefit of the general public and that its duty did not run to 
individual property owners in their private capacities.95 While noting 
that the applicable statutes imposed specific duties upon the munici­
pality, the court emphasized that the statutes imposed no specific du­
ties upon building authorities with respect to individual property 
owners.96 The court did not find that the municipality owed the plain­
tiffs a duty of due care. Relying upon the stated purpose of the build­
ing code to "insure public safety, health and welfare,"97 the court 
concluded that the duties imposed under the statute were purely "pub­
lic" in nature.98 Unable to find any statutory language or legislative 
history indicating a legislative intent to create private causes of action 
for property owners,99 the court held that "in the absence of a special 
duty owed to the plaintiffs, different from that owed to the public at 
large, no cause of action for negligent inspection can be main­
tained."loo To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would in effect 
make the municipality an insurer of construction projects, subject it to 
oppressive liability, and inhibit the passage of regulations designed for 
municipality for negligence stated a cause of action, municipal immunity may be retained 
for public policy reasons). 
93. Comment, supra note 62, at 548. 
94. See cases cited supra note 92. 
95. Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 805, 438 N.E.2d at 53. 
96. Id. at 809-10, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56. Dinsky presented a question of first impres­
sion and the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Id. at 805, 438 N.E.2d at 53. 
In basing its analysis upon the premise that "the purpose of a building code has been con­
sidered traditionally to be the protection of the general public," the court observed that it 
followed the majority rule. Id. The court continued by reviewing cases from various juris­
dictions which had invoked the traditional rule and dismissed the actions for want of an 
actionable duty. Id. at 805-08, 438 N.E.2d at 53-55. 
For a discussion of the application of the public duty rule to the issues of municipal 
liability raised in Dinsky, see Comment, supra note 62. 
97. Id. at 809 n.3, 438 N.E.2d at 55 n.3 (citing MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 780, § 100.4 
(1974». 
98. Id. at 809-10, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56. 
99. Id. at 809-10, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56. In the words of the court: "There does not 
appear to be any language in the enactments which would warrant a finding that the Legis­
lature intended to create private causes of action for' property owners on the facts of this 
case." Id. at 809, 438 N.E.2d at 55 (emphasis added). Query whether the court would still 
apply the public duty rule to a case involving serious physical injury or death arising as the 
result of a municipality's grossly negligent enforcement of a building code. 
100. Id. at 810, 438 N.E.2d at 56. 
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the protection of the public. 101 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory Intent 
In its discussion, the Dinsky court employed broad language 
which arguably constitutes precedent for applying its reasoning to 
other "public" functions, such as police and fire protection. 102 In 
placing particular emphasis upon the statutory language of the State 
Building Code,103 the court appeared willing to base the public/pri­
vate duty distinction on the intent behind the statute which prompted 
a public employee to act when harm was caused. 104 If the building 
codes make reference to the "public," courts construing the intent be­
hind them remain unwilling to broaden the statutory language to the 
extent necessary to find an actionable or "private" duty. 105 Because 
legislatures draft most highway safety statutes to emphasize the benefit 
to the "public" or the "general public," courts relying on the legisla­
tive intent theory must liberally construe the language to find the in­
tent necessary to impose an actionable, private duty upon a 
municipality. As in the cases involving building codes, a determina­
tion of municipal nonliability ought to obtain in highway safety cases 
under a statutory intent theory because most statutes intend to benefit 
the "public." 
The recent case of Bailey v. Town ofForks 106 illustrates the point. 
The plaintiff in Bailey sued the town because its police officer allegedly 
negligently failed to detain an intoxicated motorist with whom the of­
ficer had been in "official contact" shortly before the motorist's car 
struck the plaintiff. 107 The court rejected plaintiffs contention that 
101. Id. 
102. Glannon, supra note 80, at 159 n.4. 
103. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 780, § 100.4 (1974). 
104. As to the intent of the State Building Code, the code provides that 
This code shall be construed to secure its expressed intent which is to insure 
public safety, health and welfare insofar as they are affected by building construc­
tion through structural strength, adequate egress facilities, sanitary conditions, 
equipment, light and ventilation and fire safety; and, in general, to secure safety to 
life and property. 
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 780, § 100.4 (1974). 
105. A recent survey of actions against municipalities for negligent building inspec­
tions could find no case in which a plaintiff prevailed on a theory of legislative intent. 
Comment, supra note 62, at 550 n.68. 
106. - Wash. App. -, 688 P.2d 526 (1984). The facts of Bailey bear a similiarity to 
the facts of Irwin; see infra note 97. 
107. Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 528. The plaintiff's complaint asserted that the police 
officer made "official contact" with the intoxicated motorist because the officer had arrived 
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the criminal statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles re­
vealed a legislative intent to confer a cause of action upon individuals 
of a protected class. The court noted that the statutes "evidence a 
legislative concern only for the public in general and not for any par­
ticuliar member thereof or identified class."108 
In contrast to Bailey, however, the court in Irwin found that the 
applicable statutes revealed a legislative intent to impose a private 
duty upon a municipality for the benefit of an identifiable class, the 
class being "intoxicated persons and other users of the highway."109 
The class of "other users" comprises an extremely large number of 
people, encompassing almost every member of the public at one time 
or another. It is difficult to see how the class differs in any significant 
way from the "general public" denied a cause of action under the 
building codes in Dinsky.110 The statutory intent analysis which initi­
ated the public duty rule in Dinsky constitutes binding precedent, 
however, which required the same methodology to be employed in 
Irwin. 
The few cases resting explicitly upon the statutory intent ration­
ale to find a private duty owed by a municipality to a particular class 
typically involve extremely narrow situations, such as the duty to des­
ignate properly each election candidate on a ballot, III or the duty to 
comply with local ordinances authorizing property assessments to 
make public improvements. 112 In such cases, the class of potential 
plaintiffs remains small, easily identifiable, and clearly subject to direct 
at the scene of an altercation in which the intoxicated motorist was involved, had ordered 
him to depart, and had observed his departure. Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 528, 530. Shortly 
afterwards, the motorist's vehicle struck the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. 
Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 528 (quoting plaintiff's brief). 
The court entered judgment on the pleadings for the town and the plaintiff appealed. 
Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 527. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the officer had, by virtue of 
his "official contact" with the intoxicated motorist, "taken charge" of the tort feasor. Id. at 
-, 688 P.2d at 530. Apparently plaintiff was attempting to bring the action within the 
scope of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965), which imposes an individual 
duty upon "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be 
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled." Bailey, 38 Wash. App. at -, 688 
P.2d at 530 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965». Because the court 
could find no facts in the complaint to support the plaintiff's claim, it found that a duty 
under § 319 did not arise. Id. Because the court had before it merely plaintiff's complaint, 
a fair inquiry arises as to whether more substantial pleading of facts would have rendered a 
different result. 
108. Bailey, - Wash. App. at -, 688 P.2d at 529. 
109. 392 Mass. at 762, 476 N.E.2d at 1304. 
110. 386 Mass. at 810, 438 N.E.2d at 56. 

Ill. Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W.2d 189 (1944). 

112. Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 201, 71 N.E. 860, 862 (1904). 
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harm as a result of neglect of the statutory duty.l13 In contrast, apply­
ing the statutory intent rationale to Irwin effectively created a large 
class containing all users of the highways.114 The analysis falters be­
cause the causal link between the breach of the statutory duty and the 
harm suffered is extremely tenuous. I IS The end result, according to 
Dinsky, holds the municipality as an insurer to those harmed by regu­
lated activity and discourages laws designed to protect the public. 116 
B. The Special Relationship in Irwin 
The Irwin court, however, rejected Ware's effort to apply the ra­
tionale of Dinsky.117 Realizing that increased application of the public 
duty rule could reintroduce sovereign immunity, the court stated that 
it had not intended its prior decision to be so broadly read. lls The 
court also found Dinsky to be factually distinguishable: whereas the 
Dinsky plaintiffs faced the threat of long-term property damage from 
which they might reasonably protect themselves, the plaintiffs faced 
the threat in Irwin of "immediate and forseeable physical injury to 
persons who [could not] reasonably protect themselves" I 19 such that 
"a duty of care reasonably should be found."120 Most importantly, 
however, the court circumvented the public duty rule and the Dinsky 
result on the theory that a "special relationship" existed between the 
plaintiffs and the police l21 and 'the relationship served as the basis of a 
duty to act with reasonable care to prevent harm to the particular . 
plaintiffs. 122 
Most courts that disavow the public duty rule do so by finding a 
"special relationship" between the public employee and the injured 
113. Glannon, supra note 80, at 163. 
114. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 776, 467 N.E.2d at 1304 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
115. For an example of a court applying legal test of proximate cause to limit munic­
ipal liability for inadequate police protection against intoxicated motorists, see infra notes 
156-160 and accompanying text. 
116. 386 Mass. at 810, 438 N.E.2d at 56. 
117. 392 Mass. at 754, 467 N.E.2d at 1299-1300. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1300. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04. 
122. Id. at 756,467 N.E.2d at 1300. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 
(1965) sets forth the "special relationship" doctrine, providing that: 
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him 
from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between 
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the 
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the 
other which gives to the other a right of protection. 
Id. 
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party, either on the grounds that the employee acts in a manner that 
enhances the danger to the victim, 123 or fails to act in circumstances of 
known and immediate danger to a particular person. 124 The former 
situation is best illustrated by the leading case Schuster v. City ofNew 
York,125 in which the city was held liable for failing to provide ade­
quate protection to a citizen murdered after it became public knowl­
edge that he had helped apprehend the noted criminal Willie 
Sutton. 126 In another context, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ap­
plied the same theory to defeat an action arising from circumstances 
nearly identical to the Irwin case. In Shore v. Town of Stonington, 127 
the highest Connecticut court did not hold liable a police officer who 
failed to detain an intoxicated motorist whom he had stopped but per­
mitted to continue absent "a showing of imminent harm to an identifi­
able victim." 128 The Irwin court, however, discarded both the 
traditional theories and grounded its theory of a special relationship 
upon the legislative intent behind the applicable statutes. 129 In doing 
so, the court avoided the public duty rule by the same analysis under 
which it had invoked the rule in the Dinsky case. 130 
123. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. 
124. See, e.g., Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1977)(mu­
nicipality liable when aware that a dangerous condition sanctioned by the town violated 
pollution control regulations); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d I, 530 P.2d 234 
(1975)(municipality liable when inspector knew of improperly wired floodlights submerged 
in creek and failed to disconnect the wiring). See also Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 
Conn. 147, 156,444 A.2d 1379, 1383 (1982) (general duty to public does not become duty 
to individual absent showing of imminent harm to identifiable victim). 
125. 5 N.Y. 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S. 265 (I958). 
126. Id. at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S. at 269. The court reasoned that 
since citizens have a duty to aid government, government owes them a reciprocal duty of 
protection when such aid places them in danger. For a general discussion of the case, see 
Comment, Municipal Liability for Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection, 28 
FORD. L. REV. 316 (1959). 
Cf Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-83, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61, 293 
N.Y.S.2d 897,899-900 (1968) (no cause of action against police for inadequate protection 
despite police knowledge of threats against plaintiff, on the grounds that imposition of lia­
bility upon a showing of probable need for and request for police protection was an unwar­
ranted judicial allocation of resources absent legislative authorization). 
127. 187 Conn. 147,444 A.2d 1379 (1982). 
128. Id. at 156,444 A.2d at 1383 (emphasis added). See generally, Note, The Offi­
cial Responsibility Rule and Its implications For Municipal Liability In Connecticut: Shore 
v. Town of Stonington, 15 CONN. L. REV. 641 (1983)( arguing for judicial and legislative 
action to restrict application of the doctrine of municipal immunity in the context of 
drunken driving). 
129. 392 Mass. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. 
130. In both Dinsky and Irwin the court claimed to look to the language of the appli­
cable statutes to ascertain whether legislative intent to create a private duty between the 
injured party and the municipality existed. Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 809, 438 N.E.2d at 55, 56; 
Irwin, 392 Mass. at 755, 467 N.E.2d at 1300, 1302-04. 
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C. Future Cases Under Irwin 
The court could decide future cases involving municipal liability 
by determining whether the legislature intended the statute under 
which the municipal employee acted to create a private duty or a "spe­
cial relationship."131 Application of the principle could produce ineq­
uitable results; for example, it could shield a municipality from 
liability for harm caused by one of its employees acting under purely 
"public" duty, even in instances in which, because the public employee 
knew of a dangerous condition,132 interests of fairness would warrant 
compensation to a victim. 133 Similiarly, rigid application of the princi­
ple would destroy the flexibility that has enabled some courts to hold 
municipalities liable for the grossly negligent performance of purely 
"public" duties. 134 
D. Policy Considerations 
When a court finds that the applicable statute creates a private 
duty or a special relationship, but the legislature drafted the statute to 
protect the "general public," the resulting liability may present the 
municipality with considerable administrative difficulty l35 and eco­
nomic hardship.136 For the courts to encourage the enforcement of 
drunk driving laws through the imposition of tort liability prior to an 
131. See generally Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 807 n.lO 
(Minn. 1979)(citing cases finding private duty to plaintiffs based on statutes intended to 
benefit designated class, such as statutes requiring prison maintenance to ensure health and 
safety of prisoners). 
132. See, e.g., Riss, v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, IS N.Y.2d 134, 140,204 N.E.2d 635, 
637, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (1965)(noting that municipality may be liable where special 
relationship exists but finding no liability despite fire department's knowledge of defective 
stove which caused fire). 
133. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 588-89, 240 N.E.2d 860, 864-65, 
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903-04 (1968)(Keating, J., dissenting). 
134. See, e.g., Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1977)(find­
ing municipality liable when aware that dangerous condition sanctioned by the town vio­
lated pollution control regulations); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d I, 530 P.2d 
234 (1975)(finding municipality liable when inspector knew of improperly wired floodlights 
submerged in creek and failed to disconnect the wiring). Professor Glannon suggests that 
the knowledge or culpability of the defendant may in some cases be the factor determinitive 
of the issue of liability. Glannon, supra note 80, at 163 n.40. 
135. The court in Irwin rejected the town's argument that the administrative difficul­
ties inherent in determining when a motorist is intoxicated should be a significant factor in 
the determination of municipal liability. See infra text accompanying notes 146-154. 
136. The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the re­
sources of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to 
how those resources may be deployed. For the courts to proclaim a new and 
general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the partic­
ular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably 
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explicit legislative determination of municipal responsibility invites 
criticism as exceeding the reasonable limits of judicial discretion. \37 
The Dinsky court acknowledged such policy considerations138 but the 
Irwin court dismissed them as not being relevant to the issue of 
whether the police had a duty.139 
Courts frequently cite the disastrous financial consequences· of 
broad municipal tort liability as a justification for the public duty 
rule. 14O The widespread availability of insurance, however, can mini­
mize the costs of liability. 141 The Irwin court sought to address this 
financial concern by limiting damages under the Act to $100,000 per 
plaintiff, even when the plaintiff has more than one claim.142 In many 
states, the legislative enactments waiving sovereign immunity place 
ceilings upon damages. 143 In jurisdictions which do not, the question 
may arise as to whether a municipality may avoid satisfaction of a tort 
judgment under federal bankruptcy laws. 
Expanded municipal liability for police activity will force govern­
ments to allocate additional funds for increased insurance premiums 
or damage judgments but could ultimately reduce the societal costs 
associated with intoxicated motorists. l44 The result depends on 
whether the police modify their practices and enhance their efficiency 
10 order to reduce the number of incidents of actionable police 
determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated 
and without predictable limits. 
Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-82, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d 
897, 898 (1968). 
137. Id. at 588-89, 240 N.E.2d at 864-65, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04 (Keating, J., 
dissenting). 
138. Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 810,438 N.E.2d at 56. 
139. 392 Mass. at 763, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. The court refuted the implication that it 
had exceeded the limits of judicial power by noting that in passing the Act, the legislature 
had chosen to put the public funds at risk. Id. 
140. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523,456 P.2d 376, 381 
(1969); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 
(1968). 
141. See Note, An Insurance Program To Effectuate Waiver o/Sovereign Tort Immu­
nity, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 89,90 (1973)(arguing that an insurance program must be imple­
mented in order to satisfy judgments against governmental entities and suggesting a model 
statute). 
142. 392 Mass. at 766, 776, 467 N.E.2d at 1306, 1311. 
143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE! § 11-93-2 (Supp. 1983)($100,000 per claimant, $300,000 
per incident); FLA. STAT. ANN., § 768.28 (West Supp. 1984)($100,000 per claimant, 
$200,000 per incident); UTAH CODE ANN., § 63-30-34 (Supp. 1983)($250,000 per claimant, 
$500,000 per incident); cf R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 9-31-2 (Supp. 1983)($100,000 per incident 
limit waived when state is engaged in a proprietary function). 
144. Note, Police Liability For Negligent Failure To Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 821,833 (1981) (arguing the police should be held liable for negligent failure to pre­
vent crime and suggesting alternative approaches to the issue of police liability). 
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negligence. 145 
Ware asserted that imposition of liability upon the police would 
lead to an increase in arrests l46 and a loss of police discretion l47 be­
cause police officers would have to arrest suspected intoxicated motor­
ists rather than risk a negligence action. 148 Ware's argument implies 
that the courts lack the necessary expertise to review police con­
duct. 149 Courts already have experience in reviewing police actions, 
however, including claims for false arrest,150 section 1983 claims of 
police misconduct,151 and charges of fourth amendment violations. 152 
The court rejected Ware's position as speculative. 153 As a policy mat­
ter, the court appears unconcerned about preserving police discretion 
when considering intoxicated motorists. While this policy may be nec­
essary, it complicates a situation in which the demand for regulation 
frequently exceeds the capacity for enforcement. 154 
E. Evaluation 
The Dinsky and Irwin decisions base municipal liability on a pol­
icy judgment in which the court balances society's need to compensate 
injured parties against the fear of excessive municipal liability.155 In 
Dinsky the harm involved property and the plaintiffs were clearly able 
to protect themselves;156 in contrast, the harm in Irwin was physical 
and the threat posed was an imminent, transitiory threat from which 
the plaintiffs could not reasonably protect themselves. 157 The closely­
145. Id. The likelihood of arrest while driving under the influence is so low that a 
fair inquiry considers whether the imposition of tort liability will achieve the result of re­
ducing the number of incidents of actionable police negligence. See supra note 5. 
146. 392 Mass. at 762, 467 N.E.2d· at 1304. 
147. Id. See supra note 5. 
148. Id. 
149. Note, supra note 144, at 832. 
150. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Hampden County, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 138,449 N.E.2d 1227 
(1983) (negligent record keeping by county employees which led to plaintiff's improper 
arrest stated a cause of action in negligence under the Act). 
151. See, e.g., Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982)(warrantless search jus­
tified under fourth amendment when police could reasonably have believed that robbery 
suspect was hiding in plaintiff's apartment and fact that police were wrong and that only a 
child was there did not give plaintiff a right to damages under section 1983). 
152. See. e.g., Commissioner v. Barrett, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 970, 458 N.E.2d 348 
(1984)(police officer's seizure of pistol from person's trousers did not violate fourth amend­
ment); Commissioner v. Amaral, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 450 N.E.2d 656 (1983) (warrant­
less search by police justified upon a showing of exigent circumstances). 
153. 392 Mass. at 763, 476 N.E.2d at 1304. 
154. See supra note 5. 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. 
156. Glannon, supra note 80, at 160. 
157. 392 Mass. at 756, 476 N.E.2d at 1300. 
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worded holdings of both cases indicate that the court intends to define 
the limits of municipal liability on an ad hoc basis.15s The Irwin 
court's discussion, which left the public duty rule intact, further sup­
ports the ad hoc theory. Dinsky and Irwin merely begin a line of un­
doubtedly difficult cases. 159 
At present, however, the strained analysis necessitated by the Ir­
win court to circumvent the public duty rule suggest'S that the rule 
should be discarded. 160 The rule only serves to prevent an individual 
from maintaining an action against a municipality for failing to pro­
vide adequate services. 161 The rule, therefore, functions as nothing 
more than a restoration of the doctrine of sovereign immunity which 
was abolished in 1978. 162 The specious distinction the rule creates 
between duties owed to the public in general and duties owed to indi­
vidual members of the public, while appearing probative, represents 
merely "a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to 
analysis in itself."163 Since the application of the rule precludes any 
further inquiry into the specific facts which bear upon the reasonable­
ness of a public employee's conduct, courts desirous of addressing the 
reasonableness issue must engage in elaborate analysis to circumvent 
158. See supra note 99. Compare the intention in the ad hoc approach of Irwin and 
Dinsky with this statement by the court in Whitney v. City of Worcestor, 373 Mass. 208, 
366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977): 
On various occasions we have voiced our conclusion that the governmental im­
munity doctrine and· the convoluted scheme of rules and exceptions which have 
developed over the years are unjust and indefensible as a matter of logic and 
sound public policy. However, on those occasions we further concluded that 
comprehensive legislative action was preferable to judicial abrogation followed by 
an attenuated process of defining the limits of governmental liability through case 
by case adjudication. 
Id. at 209, 366 N.E.2d at 1211. 
159. Since the court unanimously endorsed the public duty rule in Dinsky and split 
4-3 over its applicability in Irwin, it appears that the court is determined to retain the rule 
for certain torts; there is, however, no workable principle as to whether the rule should 
apply to specific torts. See Glannon, supra note 80, at 159. 
160. Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, IS N.Y.2d 134, 140-41,204 N.E.2d 635,637-38, 
256 N.Y.S. 2d 595, 598-600 (1965)(Desmond, J., dissenting)(public duty rule should be 
discarded on grounds that "its injustice and unreality are so evident as to produce excep­
tions...and inconsistencies galore ... [c]ities should be held to the same standards of 
conduct as apply to private persons, since risk of liability (and insurance against the risk) is 
incidental to municipal activities.") 
161. Comment, Urban Law-Municipality Held To Have No Duty To Provide Police 
Protection To Individual Members o/the Public, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 646, 650 (1969)(assert­
ing that the public duty rule should be discarded with respect to the negligent failure of 
police to prevent crime). 
162. Id. 
163. W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 131, at 1051. 
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the rule and thus reach the more relevant issue of reasonableness. 164 
Fairness to victims, police accountability, and equitable distribu­
tion between the government and individuals of the high costs associ­
ated with intoxicated motorists provide cogent arguments for holding 
municipalities liable for the negligent provision of police services. 165 
The question then arises of how to accomodate the competing interests . 
of victim compensation and efficient government. 
V. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
The following discussion proposes alternative approaches to the 
issue of municipal liability that may strike a balance between the com­
peting interests of victim compensation and effective government. 
A. Damage Limitation 
In considering the scope of a municipality's duty to enforce the 
law by ensuring that third persons comply with the law, the initial 
premise must be that the goal of any system of liability is to compen­
sate the victims of municipal negligence justly, particularly when such 
negligence poses the threat of severe physical harm. 166 If courts adopt 
the initial premise, a substantial increase in the scope of municipal 
liability will result. To combat the effects, a ceiling on damage awards 
could be set by legislative enactment167 or judicial pronouncement; 168 
alternatively, damages could be limited to actual damages. 
B. Police Malpractice 
Under a theory of police malpractice, courts could measure police 
conduct against objective standards of conduct contained in statutes 
and internal police regulations. 169 Their violations would give rise to a 
164. Comment, supra note 161, at 652-53. 
165. Note, supra 144, at 832-35. 
166. Perhaps this is why more commentators advocate the abrogation of the public 
duty rule in the context of police failure to prevent crime than adopt this position in the 
building inspection situation. See Note, supra note 144, at 835; Comment, supra note 161, 
at 652-53. 
167. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
168. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 766, 776, 467 N.E.2d at 1306, 1311. 
169. For an example of model police regulations, see N. POMRENKE, LAW EN­
FORCEMENT MANUAL: RULES AND REGULATIONS (1967). For a thoughtful discussion of 
the need for regulations and their role in restraining police discretion, see K.DA VIS, Po­
LlCE DISCRETION 121-163 (1975). The professional standards model is discussed in Note, 
supra note 144, at 838-40. 
Judicial review of police conduct in the course of roadside checks for potential viola­
tions of the driving while intoxicated statute would be facilitated by an articulation of the 
facts upon which an officer bases his conclusion that a motor vehicle operator is or is not 
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cause of action under state tort law. 170 Reliance upon objective stan­
dards as evidence of due care would permit judicial review of police 
activity, while affording a reasonable degree of police discretion.171 
The standard would preserve police discretion because the police 
themselves would define the standard of care. 172 Only when the police 
establish a self-serving or non-existent standard would the courts be 
justified in imposing liability.173 The New York Court of Appeals es­
sentially followed the objective standard approach in Florence v. 
Goldberg,174 finding police negligent for having failed to comply with 
department regulations governing the supervision of school 
crossings. 175 
C. Traditional Negligence 
The use of a negligence standard would afford a measure of police 
discretion and would broaden the scope of judicial review of police 
activity beyond that afforded under the professional standards model. 
The abrogation of the public duty rule would permit the court in every 
instance to inquire into the reasonableness of the municipal officer's 
conduct in light of the circumstances, thus saving judicial resources. 176 
The approach would replace the current inquiry of whether the police 
owe an actionable duty with the more relevant inquiry of whether, 
under the circumstances, the police have a duty to act. 177 
Using a traditional negligence approach, the Irwin court would 
have reached the same result without necessitating the strained "spe­
cial relationship" analysis. The police, having stopped the motorist 
and determined that he was intoxicated, became aware of a forseeable 
risk of harm and the municipality at that point incurred an obligation 
to act through its servant. The uncertainties inherent under most 
negligence determinations would be mitigated by the court's clear po­
sition that "waste of life due to drunken driving on the highways 
driving while under the influence. Reese, Drunk Driving: Recommendations for Safety 
Highways, 19 TRIAL 60, 65 (June 1983). Police officers should be encouraged to fill out 
forms with each such roadside stop. Id. The Traffic Institute at Northwestern University 
has drafted a standard form for police use in such situations that "specifies the various field 
sobriety tests that should be given and provides space to list or diagram observations." The 
form, however, is rarely used. Id. at 61. 
170. Note, supra note 144, at 838-39. 
171. Id. at 838. 
172. Note, supra note 144, at 839. 
173. W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 33, at 195. 
174. 44 N.Y.2d 189, 373 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978). 
175. Id. at 193, 196,373 N.E.2d at 765, 767, 404 N.Y.S. at 585, 587. 
176. Comment, supra note 161, at 652. 
177. Id. at 652-53. 
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[does not lie] outside the scope of forseeable risk." 178 
The causation requirement of a traditional negligence scheme 
would function as a self-limiting principle to keep municipal liability 
within reasonable limits. Evers v. Westerberg l79 illustrated the point: 
the court reversed a jury verdict against the police for insufficient evi­
dence of causation. 180 Police had investigated an accident caused by 
an intoxicated motorist but had not arrested him. 181 About twenty 
minutes after leaving the scene of the first accident, the motorist 
caused a second accident in which the plaintitrs decedent was 
killed. 182 The court held that not enough evidence existed to show that 
the failure of the police to detain the driver after the first accident 
proximately caused the second accident. 183 Evers supports the notion 
that the self-limiting nature of a negligence analysis may operate to 
keep municipal liability within reasonable limits.184 
D. Legislative Action 
The supreme judicial court would prefer comprehensive legisla­
tive action to define the limits of municipal liability rather than have 
the definition evolve through judicial abrogation followed by modifica­
tion through adjudication. 18s Legislative action could take one of 
three forms. 
1. Victim Compensation Statutes 
Providing compensation to victims according to a schedule 
similiar to that used to fix workers' compensation 186 awards would 
provide several advantages. The compensatory goals of tort law 
178. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500-01, 233 N.E.2d 18,20 (1968). 
See Irwin, 392 Mass. at 762, 476 N.E.2d at 1304. ("as to the most crucial factor-for­
seeability-the calamitous consequences to the victims of accidents caused by drunken 
driving are all too predictable.") 
179. 38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), affd mem., 32 
N.Y.2d 684, 296 N.E.2d 257, 343 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1973). 
180. Id. at 752, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618. 
181. Id. at 751,329 N.Y.S.2d at 618. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 752, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618. "Even assuming arguendo, that the Village 
owed [plaintiffs] a duty, there was no proof ... that its negligence constituted a concurrent 
proximate cause of the second accident." Id. 
184. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293 
N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting) (arguing that legal principles of fault, 
proximate cause and forseeability operate to keep liability within reasonable limits). 
185. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text; see also supra note 163. 
186. The Jerm "workmen's compensation" or "worker's compensation" refers to 
"state statutes which provide for fixed awards to employees or their dependents in case of 
employment related accidents and diseases, dispensing with proof of negligence and legal 
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would be advanced allowing all victims of municipal negligence to re­
cover for their injuries. 187 Proximate cause would cease to be a limit­
ing factor, thereby avoiding the apparent inequities presented in 
Evers.18s The administrative agency in charge of the system 189 would 
possess expertise absent in the court, resulting in administrative effi­
ciency and rapid recovery for victims. 190 Statutory ceilings on damage 
awards could avoid depletion of municipal funds. 191 
Because victim compensation statutes resemble strict liability, 
however, this alternative would possess little deterrent value. 192 Since 
a general insurance fund would most likely support compensatory 
awards, little incentive would exist for police officers to adopt a more 
prudent standard of care when dealing with intoxicated motorists. 
For that reason, this approach would not be preferred. 
2. Abrogation of Immunity and the "Due Care" Exception 
Enactment of a statute similiar to Iowa's Tort Liability of Gov­
ernmental Subdivisions Act l93 would settle the ambiguities raised by 
the Irwin decision and set a firm standard for the courts to use to 
determine the limits' of municipal liability. Under the Iowa statute, a 
municipality assumes liability for the negligence of its officers and em­
ployees, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary func­
tion, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. 194 The principle 
exception exempts claims based upon the act or omission of an officer 
or employee who exercises due care in the execution of a statute, ordi­
nance, or regulation. 195 If Massachusetts had a similiar statute, a 
Massachusetts municipality would be liable for the torts of its officers 
who failed to use due care in the performance of their statutory duties. 
No requirement would exist that an officer foresee harm to a particu­
liar individual or class of persons, nor would a "special relationship" 
need to exist between the officer or employee and the injured party. 
actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1439, (5th ed. 1979). The workmen's compensation 
laws of Massachusetts are codified in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 (West 1958). 
187. Note, supra note 144, at 836. 
188. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text. 
189. This administrative agency could be similar to the Industrial Accident Board 
which oversees the administration of the workmen's compensation laws. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 23, § 16 (West 1958). 
190. Note, supra note 144, at 836 .. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. IOWA CODE ANN., §§ 613.AI-613.AI3 (West Supp. 1984). 
194. Id. § 613.A2. 
195. Id. § 613.A4(3). 
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Moreover, the financial status of the municipalities would cease to be 
of concern to the court and could be placed in the hands of the 
legislature. 196 
3. Imposition of specific liability 
A specific liability statute could waive municipal immunity for 
failure to enforce the drunk driving laws. 197 To establish a claim 
under the statute, the plaintiff would be required to show that the of­
ficer knew of a violation of the drunk driving statute and failed to use 
reasonable care in the enforcement of the statute. 198 Compensatory 
goals of tort law would be advanced while the scope of municipal 
liability for other, less dangerous torts could be avoided. Such a stat­
ute constitutes the most narrow means of effectuating the intent of the 
courts, the legislature, and the citizens' groups that have contributed 
to the national reform of drunk driving laws. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1978, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Massachusetts 
Torts Claims Act, which purported to abrogate sovereign immu­
nity.199 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a step to­
ward reinstating that immunity in Dinsky when it held that a 
municipality could not be liable for negligent building inspections.200 
In Irwin, the court held that a municipality could be liable for negli­
gent enforcement of drunk driving laws, explicitly limiting Dinsky and 
finding an exception to the public duty rule adopted in Dinsky.201 The 
policy considerations which aided the abrogation of sovereign immu­
nity apply with equal force to the abrogation of the public duty rule. 202 
The rule should be discarded and legislative action or judicial adoption 
of a negligence or professional standards model should be instituted in 
its place. 203 Reforms would end the uncertainties of municipalities 
and potential plaintiffs alike. 
Marc Elliott 
196. See Wilson v. Nepsted, 282 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 1979). 
197. See Note, supra note 128, at 657. 
198. Id. at 658. 
199. See supra notes 61-87 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 102-130 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 135-154 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text. 
